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Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a
Legal Foundation for Gay Rights
Richard A. Epsteint
I. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS VERSUS
NON-DISCRIMINATION GUARANTEES
A. General Considerations
One of the central tasks of constitutional law involves the
integration of substantive and antidiscrimination guarantees of
two types of legal rules. On the first side, the Constitution con-
tains a variety of rights that look to be substantive in nature.
High on this list are the Constitution's provisions that deal with
the protection of contracts, property, speech, and religious free-
dom. The usual strategy for the explication of these rights is to
figure out the scope of the protected individual interest, and then
to examine the putative justifications for deciding whether limit-
ing these rights serves some legitimate state interest. The former
question normally requires some account of what is covered by
the basic right: do contracts cover state issued charters? Does
property cover trade secrets?' Does freedom of expression cover
ritual slaughter? Once the coverage question is determined, the
state's countervailing interest is evaluated under the police
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi-
cago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. I would like to
thank Jamil Jaffer of the Class of 2003 for his assistance in preparing this article.
1 Consider Fletcher v Peck, 10 US 87, 128 (1810) (holding that a legislature could not
repeal an act passed by bribery in order to recover a tract of land that had been sold by the
governor after the land had passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser); Trustees of
Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 (4 Wheat) US 518, 595-96 (1819) (holding that a char-
ter granted to a private corporation was a contract).
2 Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co, 467 US 986, 1001-02 (1984) (adopting the Restate-
ment definition of trade secrets as property rights protected under the takings clause).
3 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 532-33
(1993) (ruling that a municipal ordinance prohibiting cruelty to animals was unconstitu-
tional because it was targeted at preventing the sacrificial rites practiced by adherents of
a particular religion) (superceded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as stated in
Francis v Keane, 888 F Supp 568 (S D NY 1995)).
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power: is the restriction reasonably calculated to protect the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public at large?
The strength of these substantive constitutional guarantees
turns on the relative weights of the basic right and the state jus-
tification. Speech is broadly construed to cover all forms of ex-
pressive activities, and the police power is narrowly construed to
cover direct incitements to violence, but not abstract advocacy of
the need to use force and violence to rectify chronic social injus-
tices. The taking of property for its part tends to be more nar-
rowly construed, but the police power justifications for limitations
on its use or disposition are often more broadly read. We thus
have a strong and relatively coherent law on freedom of speech,
and a system of property regulation that is commonly (and
rightly) deplored for its intellectual incoherence. The tool that
drives this difference tends to be the level of scrutiny: strict scru-
tiny yields broader basic protections and a narrower set of police
power justifications; rational basis review yields a narrower basic
coverage provision and broader police power justifications. The
two-tiered structure of modern constitutional law dramatically
shapes the outcomes of litigated cases.
The system as thus far constituted appears to leave little ex-
plicit place for the non-discrimination principle that lies at the
heart of any equal protection analysis. But without exception,
each and every substantive constitutional guarantee sooner or
later gives rise to its own equal protection dimension. The source
of this transition stems from the change in focus of legislative
action. The most obvious and direct threats to any constitutional
protection are legislative or executive actions that are directed
toward a single person.4 The government shuts down one news-
paper but not another; the government confiscates the property of
one owner but not another; the government closes down one
church but not another.
It is a sign of the success of our constitutional system that
government at all levels makes few attempts to single out indi-
viduals in this way. Rather, the scope of regulation is directed
towards broad classes of individuals. The transition is marked,
for example, by the difference between the condemnation of a
single plot of land for government use and the regulation of land
4 See Esmail v Macrane, 53 F3d 176, 180 (7th Cir 1995) (recognizing that an individ-
ual may bring an equal protection claim and noting that [a) class of one is likely to be the
most vulnerable of all"); see also Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562 (2000) (recog-
nizing "class of one" equal protection claims).
[2002:
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use in an entire neighborhood through a zoning ordinance. It is
equally well marked by the difference between shutting down a
single newspaper for its subversive views and imposing a tax on
the operating income of all newspapers, or even all businesses.
One attitude that might be taken to these various broad
statutory initiatives is to let them pass constitutional muster on
the ground that general ordinances never pose any specific threat
to particular persons. But the tide of the law in all substantive
areas, even takings law, has run decidedly and properly in the
other direction. Many statutes behave in a virtuous fashion, by
which I mean that they improve the position of each and every
party that is subject to the regulation. It is hard to see any strong
factional undercurrent in the Statute of Frauds whose major ef-
fect is to use formality in order to advance the security of ex-
change. What each person loses in his ability to enforce oral
promises, he more than gains in his ability to resist false claims
based on supposed contracts.! The formalities involved are not an
attack on freedom of contract (in the sense that they do not re-
strict the set of terms that the written agreement can contain)
but represent an effort to make contracts more efficient by reduc-
ing the uncertainties that might arise in any subsequent dispute.
In my book Takings," I took the position that these implicit
in-kind benefits from regulation supply the just compensation
required to satisfy a regulatory taking.! But, frequently, the gen-
eral nature of a statute does not guarantee that such benefits will
be evenly distributed. A statute that prevents any new real estate
construction has one set of impacts if all plots of land within the
community have been developed to the same degree. It has quite
a different, and more suspicious, impact if the majority of citizens
who support the regulation have previously developed their prop-
erty and are now determined, by "neutral" ordinance, to deny any
and all development rights to the owners who for one reason or
another have been left behind.8
5 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and
Libertarian Thought, 19 Quinnipiac L Rev 783, 795 (2000) (describing the Statute of
Frauds as an example of an "overbroad prophylactic rule ... preferable to case-by-case
adjudication after the fact").
6 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(Harvard 1985).
7 Id at 195-215.
8 For one such ordinance, see Haas v City and County of San Francisco, 605 F2d
1117, 1121 (9th Cir 1979) (denying ajust compensation claim against an anti-development
ordinance brought by the only owner of an undeveloped plot of land).
HeinOnline  -- 2002 U. Chi. Legal F.  75 2002
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
In some cases, it is easy to make direct financial measures of
the gains and losses imposed by these regulations to see which
individuals come up short and which do not. In other cases, how-
ever, direct measurement is difficult. What is needed is some re-
liable proxy for the valuation that cannot be directly made. At
this point the inquiry properly shifts to a non-discrimination test:
did the statute have the same impact on the outsiders as it did on
the dominant group?
This test has widespread use in all areas of law. It is com-
monly used to see whether a self-dealing transaction between a
corporation and its dominant shareholders prejudices the inter-
ests of minority shareholders.! It is used to see whether ostensibly
neutral tests are actually devices to engage in unlawful racial
discrimination.' It is used to determine whether state regulations
of interstate commerce pass muster under the (dormant) Com-
merce Clause." It is most emphatically used to determine
whether speech regulations of content or forum pass muster un-
der the First Amendment.'2 The tell-tale sign of impermissible
regulation is an implicit and illicit transfer of wealth or opportu-
nity from one group to another through the power of the state.
Once again, levels of scrutiny matter. In those cases where
the level of scrutiny is strict, as with the First Amendment pro-
tection of many forms of speech, the court has to be highly confi-
dent that no such transfer has taken place under the guise of
neutral regulation before it sustains a law. 3 In contract, where
the less rigorous rational basis standard of review applies, as
with the protection of private property, the court often allows
regulations with strong and conscious disparate impacts to pass
muster: a regulatory taking from A to B is practical politics, not a
" See, for example, Bayer v Beran, 49 NYS2d 2, 10 (NY 1944) (finding that equal
treatment tended to negate charges of improper self-dealing with insiders).10 Griggs v Duke Power Corp, 401 US 424, 430-31 (1971), (prohibiting an employer
from using facially neutral standardized general intelligence tests that preserved the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices).
" See, for example, Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US
333, 353 (1977) (striking down a facially neutral prohibition against publication of state
grades of apples as impermissible discrimination).
12 See, for example, R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US 377, 382-83 (1992) (discussing
the role of the non-discrimination principle in hate speech cases).
13 See, for example, United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 376-77 (1968) (upholding a
criminal conviction for burning a draft card); this affirmance is arguably inconsistent with
the content-neutral position adopted by the Court.
[2002:
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constitutional violation.4 But in both settings, the analytical ap-
proaches are the same. The shift from individualized state action
to general regulation introduces into the analysis what the "equal
protection" dimension of the various substantive constitutional
guarantees. Courts are bound to undertake this analysis. The
only question is how they will do it.
The question then arises where all this leaves equal protec-
tion analysis under the Equal Protection Clause"5 itself, when
parity between persons is not anchored to any particular sub-
stantive right. But we should be cautious before embracing the
view that the clause offers a universal guarantee against all
forms of unequal treatment, which seems to be an impossibility
given that all laws have to discriminate to some degree if they are
to function as laws at all.'6 Rather, the most sensible (but by no
means the most practiced) way to limit the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause is to recognize that its chosen domain is the
"protection" of individuals from the imposition of state power.
"Protection" for these purposes seems to refer to the power of the
state in administering the laws that secure the blessings of lib-
erty and property to all. The basic point is that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should be read in harmony with the aims and objec-
tives of the night-watchman state.7
That reading imposes real limitations on the reach of the
Clause so that it does not restrict the state in areas where "pro-
tection" is not involved, such as the distribution of benefits to
members of different groups. On this reading, the core prohibition
is that the state cannot impose heavy criminal sanctions on one
group of individuals while imposing light sanctions for the same
offense on another. It cannot do this by building in differential
punishment schedules into the statutes, nor by consciously skew-
ing the administration of facially neutral statutes.'8 Equal protec-
14 See, for example, Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 592-93 (1962) (hold-
ing that a town ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation did not constitute a
taking and was a valid exercise of police power).
15 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
16 Such is the opening theme on equal protection in Gerald Gunther and Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Constitutional Law 628 (Foundation 13th ed 1997).
17 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) (endorsing the "night-watchman
state").
'8 Note that the position in the text does not touch on the explosive question of
whether one can increase the punishment of individuals who commit admitted criminal
acts out of racial, ethnic, or religious animus. See, for discussion of that theme, Wisconsin
v Mitchell, 508 US 476 (1993), and R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US at 377. The question
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tion must extend to all persons, regardless of the content of the
particular substantive guarantee. The Equal Protection Clause
does not speak to the substantive question of whether embezzle-
ment via the Internet should be made into a crime. Rather, it
speaks to the critical question of consistency: this activity cannot
be regarded a felony for one group but a misdemeanor for an-
other.
This last point explains why there is a need for an Equal Pro-
tection Clause even in a regime that independently affords direct
protection to the substantive rights to life, liberty, and property,
as is explicitly done under the Due Process Clause. In many com-
plex situations we cannot be sure whether certain legal protec-
tions should be afforded by the state. The Equal Protection
Clause uses a non-discrimination principle as a backstop to sub-
stantive legal protections. For example, in Gulf, Colorado &
Santa Fe Railway Co v Ellis,"9 the question was whether rail-
roads, but not other tort defendants, could be required to reim-
burse successful plaintiffs for their legal fees." The Court refused
to allow the statute to stand.2' It remains an open question
whether, as a general rule, defendants should have to pay legal
expenses to successful plaintiffs in tort actions.
.A court might not be willing to insist that there is one right
answer to that question. After all, the English rule requires all
losers to pay fees to winners, while the American rule generally
requires each side to shoulder its own costs." In light of that un-
certainty, the legislature could decide whether all defendants did
(or did not) have to pay for these expenditures. But, by the same
token, the legislature could not insist on two right answers by
passing a statute that announced that only railroads had to com-
pensate successful plaintiffs for their legal fees. That selection
leads to the deep suspicion of class legislation. This type of equal
protection analysis will not answer the question of whether legal
fees in tort cases must be treated just like legal fees in mortgage
in these hate crime cases is distinct from the issue of whether one could use aggravation
for members of one race, but not for members of other races.
19 165 US 150 (1897). Portions of the company's elegant and powerful equal protection
brief are set out in Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 106-112 (Duke 1993).
20 165 US at 152-53.
21 Id at 166.
22 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Al-
ternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 58-62 (1982) (explain-
ing the difference between the American and English rules on fee-shifting).
[2002:
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foreclosure cases. But within relatively compact classes, it works
as an important break against favoritism and class legislation,
and can be defended on just those grounds, even when no suspect
classification is involved.
On this approach the Equal Protection Clause is not limited
solely to those cases of suspect classification, but also applies to
the full range of economic liberties that have received short shrift
in recent years. To see how risky it is to ignore ad hoc treatment
where no suspect classification, such as race, was involved it is
instructive to look at Railway Express Agency, Inc v New York,'
where Justice Jackson took the position that New York City was
entitled to prevent the owners of business delivery vehicles from
posting advertisements of other firms, even though they could
post advertisements of their own business. 2 This restriction hit
the Railway Express Company hard because it had 1900 trucks
in New York City on which it leased out advertisement space."
The City tried to make out a safety justification for its restriction,
on the grounds that the advertisements would distract other
drivers, but was at a loss to explain why self-advertisement posed
a lesser risk than advertisements carried for others." But never
mind. The Court simply decided that in equal protection cases
involving economic liberties, legislative motivations were beyond
its ken, so that it did not even have to entertain the possibility
that this statute was a form of class legislation that protected
other advertisers (perhaps of local billboards) from legitimate
competition.27
The result seems wrong-headed. Even the narrow view that
treats the Equal Protection Clause as dealing with protection,
and not just some broad form of equality, would require the state
to justify its use of the police power. The proof of the pudding lies
in how we would think about Railway Express today. Under an
equal protection analysis, it would not be necessary to show that
the state has no justification for keeping advertisements off the
23 336 US 106 (1949).
24 Id at 113 (Jackson concurring).
25 Id at 108 (Douglas opinion).
26 Id at 109-10 (Douglas opinion).
27 Railway Express, 336 US at 115 (Jackson concurring). It is well known how far
subsequent decisions have strayed from earlier equal protection law. See Williamson v Lee
Optical Co, 348 US 483 (1955) (upholding a law that permitted only an optometrist or
ophthalmologist to fit eyeglass lenses); Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726 (1963) (sustaining
a law which allowed only lawyers to be debt adjusters); Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery
Co, 449 US 456 (1981) (holding that a law prohibiting milk sold in plastic containers that
disproportionately benefited in-state paper producers was not discriminatory).
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sides of delivery trucks. It would only be necessary to point out
the inconsistency of allowing delivery trucks to carry some adver-
tisements while prohibiting the like privilege to others. It is
therefore possible to strike down the statute without thinking the
universal ban unjustified on substantive grounds.
More modern cases switch from the equal protection to the
First Amendment analysis, for they no longer start with the ear-
lier view that commercial speech is beyond the scope of the First
Amendment." Now that a substantive interest is implicated, New
York City could not cure its deficit by extending the ban to adver-
tisements of the vehicle's own firm. To be sure, the selective re-
striction will quickly fall before a First Amendment challenge, 9
but a neutral restriction on all advertisements still has to face the
challenge of explaining why it is necessary to promote some le-
gitimate interest in public safety, which looks difficult to do.
The argument I have sketched offers a broad place for an
equal protection analysis, both as an adjunct to specific substan-
tive guarantees, and as a free-standing protection against incon-
sistent treatment of like cases. The scope of this program, alas, is
subject to two major uncertainties. The first lies in cabining the
idea of protection so as to exclude the distribution of state bene-
fits from the list of covered activities. Here, the argument to the
contrary holds that the only benefits that the state can distribute
are those that it raises by taxation: to take from all groups uni-
formly, but to give to one group selectively could be read as a vio-
lation of the equal protection norm insofar as it relates to the im-
position of the tax. Benefits thus have to be matched with bur-
dens so that the word "protection" no longer limits the potential
reach of the clause solely to the state's night-watchman function.
The state can only give what it takes, and so long as any taking is
subject to an equal protection analysis, the associated giving is
necessarily subjected as well. The implications of this position for
the school segregation debate and the affirmative action debate
are evident. The narrow view of equal protection does not chal-
2' See, for example, Valentine v Chrestensen, 316 US 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the
First Amendment imposes no restraint on government with respect to commercial speech),
overruled by Virginia Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US
748, 761-62 (1976) (extending First Amendment commercial speech protection to adver-
tisements of prescription drug prices); Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego, 453 US 490,
509 (1981) (allowing a ban of commercial billboards on First Amendment grounds because
it would improve aesthetics and traffic safety).
29 See, for example, City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc, 507 US 410, 430-31
(1993) (striking down over aesthetic and safety objections a selective ban on newsracks on
public streets).
[2002:
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lenge either the use of segregated schools or affirmative action,
since neither goes to the protective functions of the state. But the
broader view either condemns both, or forces someone to find a
norm that allows a distinction to be drawn between them.n
The second problem is every bit as persistent. What counts as
a "group" for the purposes of this guarantee? Suppose that the
state wants to impose heavier sentences on all repeat offenders.
Do they count as a separate group that cannot be singled out un-
der the Equal Protection Clause? Or do they count simply as part
of the general population, all of whose members have been told in
advance that they will be more severely punished the second time
than they were the first? I have no doubt that the latter is the
preferred interpretation, at least if the statute only counts (first
or second) offenses committed after its passage. But, just the abil-
ity to pose that question forces one to ask which distinctions re-
quire scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and which do
not. Does a progressive income tax violate the Equal Protection
Clause because it singles out people of greater wealth for heavier
treatment? Why not? Well, one reason is that they obtain this
status not by birth,"1 but by effort. However, it is not clear why or
how this should matter.
These few examples are enough to show what everyone al-
ready knows: the Equal Protection Clause presents massive and
unavoidable interpretive difficulties of its own. We have to decide
what distinctions matter so that we can determine which forms of
discrimination call for a presumptive condemnation. Why pre-
sumptive? Because the same two-stage analysis that is applied to
the individual substantive guarantees has an equally critical role
to play in equal protection cases. Just as rights to property and
speech are not "absolute," so too with the prohibition against non-
discrimination on any ground.
Just consider this short history. In the early part of 2001, the
mere thought of racial profiling was denounced on the ground
that any deviation from the non-discrimination norm on the basis
30 For my treatment of this issue, see, Richard A. Epstein, A Rational Basis for
Affirmative Action - Mich L Rev - (forthcoming 2002).
31 See, for example, Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan) (plu-
rality) (determining whether women constituted a suspect class, the Court stated that
immutable characteristics are "determined solely by the accident of birth"); Ristaino v
Ross, 424 US 589, 596 n 8 (1976) ("In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitu-
tional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that
justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or
the choice of religion.") (emphasis added).
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of race or national origin was per se unconstitutional.2 After Sep-
tember 11, 2001, it is hard to find any voices who think that all
forms of racial profiling are per se illegitimate, let alone unconsti-
tutional.3 The need to prevent terrorist attacks falls within any
sane person's definition of the police power, and, in some circum-
stances, we are willing to exercise that power even when faced
with the certain knowledge that some upstanding individuals of
Arab origin will be subjected to far greater scrutiny than their
non-Arab peers.
B. The Privacy Context
These general ruminations play out in explicit fashion in
connection with the question of whether equal protection or pri-
vacy is the appropriate framework in which to analyze the rights
of gays and lesbians. Here, my first instinct is to bridle at the way
the question is formulated because it seems better to ask what
rights all individuals have under the Constitution just by virtue
of being citizens of the United States or persons subject to its
laws. I am much more comfortable with starting from general
principles and reaching a specific conclusion about a given group,
than I am with starting with an affinity for particular groups and
then casting about for the general principles that secure them
their desired rights. Therefore, the question that I put is: how
might this general approach apply when we look first to substan-
tive protections of individual rights and then through the equal
protection lens? My thesis is that, rightly understood, and in con-
trast to the position taken by Andrew Koppelman," the two ap-
proaches tend to converge on most (but not all) issues regardless
3 See, for example, Wayne Washington, US Vows Suits on Racial Profiling: New
rights Chief Details a Strategy, Boston Globe A3, (July 23, 2001) (quoting the Justice De-
partment's newly confirmed civil rights chief, as saying that the Department is deter-
mined to stamp out racial profiling: "There may be people we need to clobber over the
head, and if we need to clobber people over the head, we'll do that.").
33 Consider James Q. Wilson and Heather R. Higgins, Profiles in Courage, Wall Street
J A12 (Jan 10, 2002) (arguing that "most profiling is not racial, that some profiling (even
when it involves race) is essential under some circumstances, and that it would be impos-
sible for law enforcement to do its job without taking into account the observable features
of people"). But see Deborah Ramirez and Jack Levin, Op-Ed, Profiling Terrorists Not The
Answer, Boston Herald 25 (Nov 7, 2001) "Prior to the attack on America, racial profiling
was considered a blatant civil rights violation.... In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attack,
however, thousands of Arabs and Muslims complain that they are being unfairly scruti-
nized and harassed. A practice that was once considered intolerable is now accepted as a
necessary tactic in the war on terrorism.").
3' See generally Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy?, 2002 U Chi Legal F 105
(arguing that the right to privacy is a weak basis on which to defend gay rights).
[2002:
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of the best efforts to keep them apart. The dominant issue then
deals with second order effects: which journey has fewer bumps
along the way?
Let us start with the question of how to think about individ-
ual rights as they relate to matters of marriage, sex, and procrea-
tion. Koppelman downplays the benefits of locating the analysis
of these issues in substantive guarantees and finding them in-
stead in the Equal Protection Clause." In one sense, he is surely
right. The particular provision that generates many of these lib-
erty and privacy rights is the Due Process Clause, which provides
that no state shall deny any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The most obvious reading of this
clause is that it deals only with the procedural issues on such
matters as hearing, notice, and the opportunity to be heard-
issues that are part and parcel of ordinary judicial proceedings,
both criminal and civil. But, there is an extensive body of litera-
ture, which I will not attempt to summarize here, that reads the
clause quite differently and concludes that it has a substantive
dimension, such that "without due process" is read to mean "in
accordance with the law of the land."' In specific contexts, this
understanding becomes "without just compensation."' At this
point, the clause is transformed into a takings-like clause that
covers not only private property, but life and liberty (and access
to public property) to boot.
The extension from private property to personal liberty is
quite important because the hard question is whether we can
think of any interest that is worthy of protection that does not, in
principle, fall within either of these two heads. Certainly, to a
committed Lockean, the reach of the Due Process Clause has to
be regarded as comprehensive and not selective in its ambitions.
It reads as a lightly edited version of the fundamental govern-
35 Id at 105.
36 See, for example, James W. Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const Commentary 315 (1999).
31 See, for example, Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law, 42 Harv L Rev 149 & 365 (1928-29). For a recent account of the early
authorities in this direction, see Ely, 16 Const Commentary at 315 (cited in note 36) (pro-
viding an historical account of how substantive due process has been used to safeguard
non-economic rights). Judicially, the equation between "without just compensation," and
"without due process" was made in Lindsay v East Bay Street Commissioner, 2 Bay 38, 59
(US 1796), which held that compensation was constitutionally mandated by the due proc-
ess standard.
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ment guarantees to "lives, liberties, and estates," the very protec-
tion of which is the basis for government.!"
So how does this play out in concrete circumstances? In deal-
ing with the question of privacy, a central question is how far
back we go in constitutional discourse. One position, taken by
Koppelman, starts the analysis by accepting that Lochner v New
York' was wrongly decided, therefore suggesting that it is taboo
to venture into the area of gay rights with a due process strategy
that requires one to distinguish any right to privacy decision from
Lochner.° But this argument is incorrect, I think, on both
grounds. The first point is that we should regard Lochner not as a
constitutional horror story, but as a model for sensible constitu-
tional deliberation. Indeed, Lochner is properly seen as the model
that is, in practice, faithfully followed in modern constitutional
law dealing with the substantive guarantees raised in connection
with, for example, speech, religion, and federalism. The second
point is that this model carries over to the area of gay rights,
where it yields results that are sometimes supportive of, and in
other cases critical of, the various claims of that agenda. Let us
consider these two points in order.
C. Lochner Revisited
The question before the Supreme Court in Lochner was
whether to strike down a criminal statute that limited the num-
ber of hours that certain kinds of bakers could work to sixty per
week and ten per day.4' For what it is worth, the original briefs in
the United States Supreme Court framed the case as an equal
protection challenge on the ground that there was no intelligible
distinction between the bakers who were subject to the regulation
and those who lay beyond its scope.2 In light of the above argu-
38 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 123 at 66 (Hackett 1980). The dan-
gers and uncertainties that each person finds in a state of nature makes him "willing to
join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, prop-
erty."
39 198 US 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937).
40 See Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the
Changing Meaning of Non-Discrimination, 23 Cardozo L Rev 1819, 1838 n 92 (2002) (dis-
paraging the Supreme Court's decision in Dale as a "Lochner-like arrogation to itself of the
power to review the needfulness of legislation").
41 See Lochner, 198 US at 45-46.
42 See Brief for Plaintiff in Error Joseph Lochner, Lochner v New York, No 292, *7-8
(Sup Ct filed Oct 1904). Thus, the plaintiff's oral argument began:
[2002:
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ments, there is in principle nothing wrong with this approach, for
in fact the statutory distinction was arbitrary with respect to any
safety rationale that could be advanced to support the hour lim-
its, not to mention other features of the statute. The nice point
about the equal protection analysis is that it allows one to strike
down the statute without having made a strong commitment as
to whether regulation of this sort makes sense if enacted across
the board. The great weakness of the position is that it has noth-
ing to say if the statute were drafted so that it covered all mem-
bers of the relevant class (for which read here, bakers) by the
same rule. At that point the rule may be sound or unsound, but it
is not discriminatory. Yet if the definition of the relevant class is
expanded to cover all workers in, say, heavy industry, then the
equal protection analysis once again bubbles to the surface be-
cause we could have a distinction between bakers on the one
hand and other forms of workers on the other. The modern case
law is, of course, four-square against this approach.
The question is what is at stake when we shift the analysis
from equal protection to due process. Here the threshold question
involves a dispute over the content of the term "liberty." Here one
could-wrongly in my view-take the narrow reading of liberty
to cover only the ability to move about without hindrance. On this
view, the correlative tort to individual liberty under the Constitu-
tion is false imprisonment. But the ordinary definition of liberty
surely goes much further than mere mobility and covers the
rights to engage in virtually all productive labor until and unless
these activities cause harm to another. Justice Peckham was cor-
rect when he said in Allgeyer v Louisiana:43
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
The statute in question denies to certain persons in the baking trade the
equal protection of the laws. The legislation must affect equally all per-
sons engaged in the business of baking in order to conform to this provi-
sion of Article 14 of the United States Constitution. It really affects but a
portion of the baking trade, namely, employees "in a biscuit, bread or
cake bakery, or confectionery establishment."
Lochner, 198 US at 48 (quoting plaintiff's original Supreme Court brief).
43 165 US 578 (1897).
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lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all con-
tracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned."
How could it be otherwise? If the state decided to pass a law
that said no person could enter into a contract for the next six
months, the natural and correct response would be to call this
limitation an infringement of individual liberty, namely, liberty
of contract. Once we start down this road, a prohibition that lim-
its a particular form of contract with a particular class of persons
is an infringement of liberty as well, albeit narrower than the one
just mentioned.
Allgeyer raised no serious police power issue, for neither
fraud nor safety were at stake under the challenged law. In
Lochner, the battlefront switched to the police power, and
Peckham's next challenge was to figure out whether the restric-
tion in question could be justified as a legitimate means for pro-
tecting the health, safety, and morals of the affected workers. At
this point, the due process analysis could cut deeper than the
equal protection analysis. Once contractual freedom is treated as
protected, then it is no longer sufficient for the state to say that
all forms of labor within some relevant class (be it bakers or in-
dustrial workers) are subject to the same kinds of restriction.
That would eliminate the discrimination-based challenge, conge-
nial to an equal protection analysis, which by assumption does
not treat the underlying activity as a protected liberty. But the
due process analysis does find the activity to be a protected lib-
erty and here the state can fail in its justification even if it can
show a uniform restriction across the relevant class unless that
restriction has a justification in promoting the health and safety
of the regulated workers. The identification of the presumptive
liberty robs the state of the consistency justifications that work
under equal protection.
The next question is whether the statute falls within the am-
bit of the police power. Here, the most aggressive line of argu-
14 Id at 589. The Louisiana statute in Allgeyer prohibited any out-of-state firm from
entering into a contract for marine insurance unless it was licensed to do business in
Louisiana, even when the contract was concluded in New York. Id at 579. That statute
would clearly raise issues today under the dormant commerce clause, given the explicit
discrimination against out-of-state businesses.
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ment against the statute was one that Peckham did not take.
Health risks are part and parcel of the job so that the worker is
better positioned to evaluate the benefits and burdens of an em-
ployment contract than the state, making all purported safety
restrictions invalid within the industrial context. But this ap-
proach too had been ruled out by the previous case law that
safety regulation within consensual contexts was allowed in such
dangerous employments as the mines and the rails.45 Justice Pit-
ney was to invoke the same approach in upholding the workmen's
compensation statutes a decade later. 6 Peckham's inquiry, there-
fore, was more particular and focused on the real possibility that
what was at stake was a "labor" statute, that is, a statute which
was designed to protect one class of firms and workers against
open competition by a rival." In this context the uniform exten-
sion of the statute would not count as an argument in its favor. It
would only signal a more blatant infringement of the liberty of
workers to determine their own labor situation.
Another approach to Lochner is to argue that this particular
statute should not be considered in isolation but against the
backdrop of a large number of other government initiatives, some
of which had worked in favor of Lochner and his workers and
others against it. The point here, stressed recently by Daryl Lev-
inson in his criticism of Takings, is that the claim of deprivation
looks credible only when the particular statute is considered in
"transactional" isolation from the full range of laws, some of
which benefited Lochner and others which did not." Who knows
what state subsidy or benefit Lochner and his crew received at
the expense of other individuals. But this argument cannot work
as a serious matter. No doubt Lochner was decided in a second-
best universe in which many other programs were approved by
government that should have been repealed. But the first best
way to deal with those programs is to repeal or invalidate them.
It is not to pass a second program that compounds the problem.
15 Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 370 (1898) (finding it was outside the legislature's
power to prevent competent persons from entering into employment contracts merely
because the employment is considered to be dangerous).
" New York Central Railroad v White, 243 US 188, 205 (1917) (holding that a work-
men's compensation act providing for compulsory compensation without regard to fault,
except willful acts of employees to produce injury, did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
'" Allgeyer, 165 US at 591-92.
See, for a parallel, Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 Yale L J 1311, 1338-1345 & 1350-1352 (2002), criticizing Epstein, Takings, at 210-
212 (cited in note 6).
HeinOnline  -- 2002 U. Chi. Legal F.  87 2002
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
Thus this situation is quite different from portions of a unified
program that provide parallel benefits and impose parallel re-
strictions on a regulated class, where there is some reason to
think that the package would not have been adopted if its overall
consequences were negative. The Levinson proposal of larger con-
stitutional aggregation results in the unfortunate consequence of
lumping together undesirable programs and then treating each
mistake as though it were the justification for the other. It is a
very dangerous business to think that the benefits a regulated
party shares with the rest of the world offer compensation for the
losses of particular program. No one would set off the benefits of
living in a well-regulated society from the losses attributable to
the direct government occupation of land. Nor should those dif-
fuse benefits count any more as a set off in a regulatory takings
or economic liberties case. The principle of average reciprocity of
benefit was well-known during the Lochner era." It was for good
reason that it was never applied to cases of labor restrictions
whose dominant effect was to suppress competition, not promote
safety.'
The arguments in favor of Peckham's conclusion were in fact
fortified by what appeared to be the situation on the ground. The
full statute, of which the hours provision was a part, contained
extensive requirements (which should have been challenged but
49 See Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415 (1922), citing Plymouth Coal Co v
Pennsylvania, 232 US 531 (1914). For my analysis of Pennsylvania Coal, see Richard A.
Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence of Justice
Holmes, 86 Geo L J 875, 891-905 (1998).
'0 Note too that Levinson's forceful claims are wrong for two other reasons. First, he
insists that common law deals with interactions between strangers and thus does not face
the overlap problem that comes from the continuous level of interactions between the
individual and the state. But while that is true in the simplest case of suits between two
individuals, it does not characterize common law as a piece. Thus any tort action brought
by a corporate shareholder injured by a corporate truck has the shareholder on both sides
of the transaction, but presumptively, the overlap is ignored because the shareholder
bears a disproportionate share of the loss. The same argument applies in the takings
context. Second, the better rule on set-offs does not allow any general social benefit (for
example, roads) to be set off against particular takings, but requires a showing that the
benefit provided is in some sense "unique" to the persons for whom it constitutes a set off,
as is the case when new roads are built into otherwise unbuilt territories. See generally,
Robert Ellickson and Daniel Tarlock, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials, 718 (Little
Brown 1981): "An oft-repeated maxim of special-assessment law is that a landowner may
only be assessed for special benefits, not for any general benefits that also accrue to others
in the community. The same distinction appears in eminent-domain law, where only the
special benefits bestowed by a public project on a condemnee's undertaken land may be
allowed to be set out against the condemnee's condemnation award." The authors then go
on to note that this distinction has been under attack precisely for the way in which it
limits government. See Charles M. Haar & Barbara Hering, The Determination of Benefits
in Land Acquisitions, 51 Calif L Rev 833, 848-851 (1963).
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were not) including sections regulating the ventilation conditions
in sleeping quarters.51 It appeared that non-union bakers in cer-
tain upstate firms came to work late in the day, baked the bread,
then slept on the job-hence the ventilation requirements-
awoke the next day, and prepared the finished loaves for ship-
ment. Their rival union firms worked two shifts. On this account,
the entire picture starts to fit together. The hours statute had a
massive disparate impact on the two types of firms. Non-union
firms were paralyzed by its application; union firms could glide
by largely unimpeded."
The result in Lochner thus made sense within this frame-
work because the ostensible concern with safety was little more
than a pretext for doing in the other guy. On this view of the
situation, we should take the "revisionist" accounts of Lochner
more seriously. Thus, Howard Gillman, who also thinks the deci-
sion was wrongly decided, at least offers an account of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century use of the police power
that is fully consistent with this position:
[Ilt is my contention that the decisions and opinions that
emerged from state and federal courts during the Lochner
"' New York Labor Law § 113 read:
Wash-rooms and closets; sleeping places.-Every such bakery shall be
provided with a proper wash-room and water-closet or water-closets apart
from the bake-room, or rooms where the manufacture of such food product
is conducted, and no water-closet, earth-closet, privy or ash-pit shall be
within or connected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or
public restaurant.
No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a bake-room. Sleeping places
for the persons employed in the bakery shall be separate from the rooms
where flour or meal food products are manufactured or stored. If the
sleeping places are on the same floor where such products are manufac-
tured, stored or sold, the factory inspector may inspect and order them
put in a proper sanitary condition.
Lochner, 198 US at 47 n 1.
52 For a further discussion, see Rebecca L. Brown, Constitutional Tragedies: The Dark
Side of Judgment, in William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Sanford Levinson, eds, Constitutional
Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 139, 142 (NYU 1998) ("[Slubsequent analysts ...
have demonstrated that the law at issue in Lochner, despite its guise as a health regula-
tion, was probably a rent-seeking, competition-reducing measure supported by labor un-
ions and large bakeries for the purpose of driving small bakeries and their large immi-
grant workforce out of business."); Epstein, The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence of Justice
Holmes, 86 Geo L J at 884 (cited in note 49) ("[Lochner's] basic purpose was not to protect
these workers, but rather to insulate the unionized bakeries that employed workers in two
ten-hour shifts against competition from nonunion firms that deployed their workers in
single twenty-hour shifts, and thus were caught by the statute.").
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era represented a serious, principled effort to maintain
one of the central distinctions in nineteenth-century con-
stitutional law-the distinction between valid economic
regulation, on the one hand, and invalid "class" legislation,
on the other-during a period of unprecedented class con-
flict. 3
The term "class legislation" has in a sense the same ambigu-
ity that exists in dealing with due process and equal protection.
Legislation could be class legislation because it distinguishes be-
tween some classes of bakers and others; or it could be class legis-
lation because it burdens one class of firms and workers solely to
benefit rival firms and their workers. Stated somewhat differ-
ently, valid economic regulations, like the Statute of Frauds, are
those that tend to advance the long-term interests of all those
who fall within its ambit. Invalid class legislation is that which
redistributes opportunities and wealth between participants in
what otherwise would be a competitive market, which is just
what the maximum hours statute in Lochner did. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court did not in 1905 resort to the full panoply of
techniques that might be used today to distinguish one type of
regulation from another. But, that said, the effort to distinguish
between positive sum projects brought on by regulation when
transaction costs are high, and negative sum transactions
brought about by political faction is, and should remain, the cen-
tral task of all constitutional law.
The deep constitutional logic of both equal protection and due
process converge on this single objective. The difference between
them is that equal protection can knock out only inconsistencies
when the right answer is not known, while due process can knock
out uniform limitations on liberties, so long as the right answer to
the police power question is known. That is just about how the
overall situation should shake out. Lochner is defensible not only
as a period piece, but also as a matter of larger social theory.
II. MODERN SEXUAL REGULATION
A. From Griswold to Bowers
At long last, the question now is how all this plays out in
connection with modern regulation in what might loosely be
" Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 10 (cited in note 19).
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called the sphere of social, as opposed to economic, relations. In
one sense, the key case that tested this transition was Griswold v
Connecticut," where the Court struck down a Connecticut statute
that prohibited the sale of contraceptives.5 The single greatest
difficulty that stood in the path of a rational resolution of that
case was the felt need to steer clear of the Lochner decision and
its dreaded doctrine of substantive due process, while striking
down a statute that looked both antiquated and perverse. That
difficulty led Justice Douglas into his famous riff about the search
for penumbras to various provisions of the Bill of Rights,56 which
seems to be a confession of the textual illegitimacy of the result
obtained. Fortunately, there is an easier way to understand the
transaction which begins with the prosaic observation that the
statute in Griswold prohibited the sale of a certain item, and thus
under Allgeyer and Lochner was presumptively an impermissible
limitation on freedom of contract. That said, the question then
turns to the issue of the justification for the restriction in ques-
tion, which it is hard to imagine today except under the old mor-
als head of the police power.
1. The morals head of police power to regulate
private conduct.
Within the nineteenth century constitutional framework,
Griswold quickly has to address an issue that was largely absent
in Lochner about the scope of the morals head of the police power.
There is no question that the traditional view of the subject al-
lowed for extensive regulation of sexual conduct outside mar-
riage. For starters, it made it possible to ban prostitution and to
criminalize homosexual behavior. Today the question rears its
head in a variety of contexts, including the regulation of nude
dancing, on which the different interpretive approaches yield
very different outcomes.57 But for these purposes, I shall stay
381 US 479 (1965) (holding that a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives
unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy).
55 Id at 485.
6 See id at 484.
17 See, for example, Schad v Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61, 76 (1981) (stat-
ing that nudity alone was not outside of First Amendment and holding that nude dancing
was protected because the ordinance in question was too broad); Barnes v Glen Theatre,
Inc, 501 US 560, 567-68 (1991) (upholding a state law requiring minimum clothing for
nude dancers with a welter of rationales); City of Erie v Pap's A.M., 529 US 277, 296
(2000) (upholding ban as a content-neutral ordinance and as satisfying the O'Brien test for
restricting symbolic speech).
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within a determined, but cautious libertarian stance, and put the
question this way: how can we deconstruct the morals head of the
police power so that it becomes congruent with the traditional
principled reasons that justify restrictions on freedom of contract
within a general libertarian framework? My purpose here is not
to show that these arguments fit within the framework of current
or historical understandings of the law. It is only to show that
they fit within a coherent conception of the police power.
In dealing with this broad inquiry, we can quickly dismiss
the idea that the morals head allows us to reach certain monopo-
listic practices that could not be proscribed without it. Rather, the
more promising set of analogies goes to the negative external ef-
fects that certain conduct has on persons who are not party to the
contracts. On this issue, Peckham was no fool. In addition to All-
geyer, he had previously written an opinion which upheld the use
of the antitrust laws against monopoly precisely because of its
systematic adverse effects on consumers and on social welfare
generally."' And the common law historically had a rule against
the enforcement of contracts to use force or fraud against third-
persons, actions that were subject to criminal punishments as
well. The concern with externalities went still further, and it was
well-established long before Lochner that the state could properly
invoke its police powers in order to enjoin nuisances and, of
course, to impose quarantines on individuals who suffered from
contagious diseases.59
This last category comes closest to our concerns. In an age
before we had a strong knowledge of the modes of disease trans-
mission by sexual contact, the choice was often between being
safe and being sorry. Hence, the broad bans on certain forms of
behavior could more easily be justified because of the lack of
knowledge about how these protections could remain effective
when kept more narrowly tailored. Much of the earlier morality
on fornication, prostitution, and homosexual activity was stirred
by the inchoate fear that high levels of sexual contact produced
strongly negative social consequences-syphilis and worse. My
58 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co v United States, 175 US 211, 247-48 (1899) (holding that
the use of an internal bidding scheme and geographic market division among pipe
manufacturers to determine who would submit a winning bid was a per se illegal restraint
of trade in violation of the antitrust laws no matter how reasonable the fixed prices were
or how necessary the restraints were to prevent financial ruin).
69 See, for example, Fertilizing Co v Hyde Park, 97 US 659, 667 (1878) (holding that
the state could use its police power to stop a company from making and converting animal
matter into chemical products).
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argument is ultimately that moralisms take over when specific
information is wanting, and that in an unconscious way this
proposition helps explain much, but by no means all, of the evolu-
tion of the morals head of the police power.6O
The scientific basis and the legal position, of course, changed
radically on these issues by the time of Griswold. On the former
issue, the mechanisms of sexual transmission were well estab-
lished (although that knowledge was not so complete as to pre-
vent the rapid spread of AIDS less than a generation later). More
to the point, the use of contraception within marriage began pri-
marily to serve as a device either for birth control or limiting the
risk of sexual transfer of deadly diseases such as hepatitis. Put
these two points together, and it becomes quite impossible to ar-
gue that invoking the morals head of the police power in Gris-
wold allows the state an indirect way to control risks of external
harms whose etiology was not fully determined. Quite the oppo-
site, the ban on contraceptives itself posed a health risk. In light
of these considerations, the traditional Lochner framework sup-
ports Griswold's outcome without its messy resort to penumbras
in the desperate effort to distance itself from Lochner. The stat-
ute imposed a limitation on freedom of contract that was not jus-
tified on grounds of health, safety, or even morals.
2. Reassessing the use of moralisms to regulate
sexual conduct.
The situation, of course, shifted a bit with Eisenstadt v
61Baird, where the question was whether the Griswold decision-
which appealed so frequently to the norm of marital privacy-
extended to allow the use of contraception by unmarried per-
sons. 2 In truth, under the traditional analysis of the police power,
this case is actually a bit closer to the line but not by much. It is
closer because unmarried persons do not usually have sexual re-
lations with only one person but are more likely than married
6 For these purposes, I hasten to add that this account will not deal with all of the
many manifestations of the police power in nineteenth century law. Thus it was common
to treat idleness as a moral offense, which in turn led one court to sustain a ban on bowl-
ing. See State v Haines, 30 Me 65 (1849). For a fuller discussion of the many uses of the
morals head of the police power, see William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America, 149-191 (1996).
61 405 US 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that a state statute permitting the sales of
contraceptives to married persons, but not to single persons, violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
62 Id at 453.
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couples to have them with many individuals. The infection risk,
therefore, of rapid sexual transmission through the general popu-
lation is far greater. But how does a ban on contraception stop
this problem? It might induce individuals to refrain from sexual
activities for fear of the risk, or it might tempt people to engage
in unprotected sex. Chances are that some individuals will em-
brace one alternative and some the other. In these circumstances,
it hardly looks as though the ban on contraceptive use has any
plausible systematic justification as an anti-infection measure.
But, we do know that it strongly interferes with private sexual
conduct that presumably produces gains (or at least pleasures) to
its participants.
At this point, we are once again forced to ask whether the
morals head of the police power actually serves as a weak proxy
for the prevention of the spread of diseases, or whether it simply
reflects an arguably outmoded social attitude that allows the
dominant citizenry to vent its emotional offense at the sexual
practices of a minority. In fact, these two impulses were weakly
correlated because part of the generalized resentment toward sex
outside of marriage responded to ever-weaker perceptions of gen-
eralized health risks to the population at large. But at this point,
the case for the broad, prophylactic role of the police power starts
to crumble. Few, if any, specific harmful externalities can be
shown to flow from the use of contraception. And mere offense at
the sexual practices of another is not a justification for limiting
the liberty of actions of others any more in this context than in
the contexts of religion, speech, or anything else.
The bottom line is that the language on morals takes a 180-
degree turn. What used to be "unnatural or immoral" conduct be-
comes "intimate associations," which of course receive the highest
level of protection under the law.' At this point, it is hard to de-
termine whether social attitudes led to legal changes, or whether
the reverse was true. What does seem clear is that once sexual
conduct lost its perceived connection to the infection risk, both
social attitudes and legal norms changed in response to the new
information. Sexual practices that could have been banned with-
out so much as a whimper of protest in the Lochner era become
the protected conduct, or so one thinks, in the new era.
Consider Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537, 545
(1987) (recognizing a substantive due process right "to enter into and carry on certain
intimate or private relationships").
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The course of sexual freedom has not remained untroubled
since the mid-1960s. The most conspicuous cause cdl~bre of con-
stitutional law during the 1980s was probably Bowers v Hard-
wick, " in which the Supreme Court upheld the (somewhat tan-
gled) application of a criminal antisodomy law in what, in retro-
spect, seems to have been a clear legal attack on homosexual con-
duct.6 The decision of course revealed wide fissures in the inter-
pretation of the police power. Those justices who hewed to the
traditionalist view of the police power had only one inquiry: could
they find extensive documentation of laws restricting sexual lib-
erties at the time of the Founding, to which the answer was an
easy and resounding yes." But, the dissenters thought that the
law could be sustained only by offering some functional justifica-
tion for these restrictions, which they could not find."7
B. Sodomy Laws and Same-Sex Marriages:
The Privacy Argument
The drift of this discussion should make it evident that I take
a quirky, functional, non-traditional view of the nature and the
limits of the police power. The basic concerns with liberty and
choice should be limited only to the extent that we deal with the
control of external harms, of which contagion risks and monopoly
surely count high. Otherwise, the change in technology and un-
derstanding should narrow the scope of the police power today
just as it broadened the scope of the police power during the nine-
teenth century.
At this point, we are now in a position to take a look at two
problems that arise in connection with this project: what is the
relationship of equal protection and privacy in connection with
various issues of gay rights? In dealing with these arguments,
Koppelman deliberately plays down the privacy side of the pic-
ture and pushes hard on the equal protection front. In light of my
earlier analysis,' this seems like a dubious strategy given the
overlapping nature of the two claims. To see why it makes sense
to wage a two-front war, consider both gay marriage (or domestic
478 US 186 (1986).
Id at 196.
Id at 192-93.
6 See id at 206 (Blackmun dissenting), 217-18 (Stevens dissenting).
" See Section IA.
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partnerships) and the antisodomy laws in Bowers. How should
they be treated?
Koppelman's initial approach is to counsel against the use of
a privacy theory in part because it brings back strains of Lochner
and in part because it looks a bit like Swiss cheese. 9 Robert Bork
has a new ally. Koppelman is surely correct that the resemblance
among Griswold, gay marriage, and Lochner is more than skin
deep.0 But he is wrong to think that the Swiss cheese configura-
tion is troublesome to the analysis. To make the analysis more
concrete, it seems to me that most privacy claims really involve a
composite of claims that are based on the exercise of personal lib-
erty and the protection of ordinary property. Given my prior ar-
guments, both liberty and property enjoy presumptive protection.
The only remaining issue is whether we can identify some state
interest that makes sense under this limited account of the police
power, which I do not think is the case.
In order to undercut that enterprise, Koppelman makes ref-
erence to Kendall Thomas's useful tripartite classification: zonal,
relational, and decisional. 1 He concludes that none of these forms
of privacy can claim absolute status. In so doing, he gives the
right answer to the wrong question. The right question asks
whether the state can justify its restriction on the ordinary pro-
tections of liberty or property in light of these three facets of pri-
vacy.
1. Liberty within protected "zones."
In traditional thought, this notion allows individuals greater
liberty in their protected zones than in some public space. This
sounds right, for the position amounts to little more than a pre-
sumption that individuals are entitled to the exclusive possession
and use of their own property, but are subject to more limitations
when they share common property with others, for example,
highways and parks.
But how far does the presumption go? The exclusivity re-
quirement can surely be breached in cases of necessity, such as
when a person enters your land in order to escape a lynch mob or
a storm. The rights to property can also be limited to prevent the
69 See Koppelman, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 106-08 (cited in note 34).
70 See id.
71 See Koppelman, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 109, citing Kendall Thomas, Beyond the
Privacy Principle, 92 Colum L Rev 1431, 1443-49 (1992).
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commission of nuisances against others. The situation gets more
cloudy when we deal with the use of dangerous drugs or sex with
a minor -Koppelman's cases.2 No one would claim that doing
these activities on one's own private property insulates them
from government regulation if they are otherwise subject to regu-
lation in the first place. The dangers of heroin use stem from its
effects on the user, not on the location where it is injected. The
point of the prohibition against sex with minors is to protect their
health and welfare. The ordinary rules on the incapacity of chil-
dren to contract may be suspended with contracts for necessaries,
but you cannot enter into any contract you please with a minor so
long as you first lure the child into your own house. Quite the
opposite, operating on private property counts, for these circum-
stances, as an aggravating factor because the dangers of child
abuse seem greater when the infant is enticed into a secluded
space controlled by a would-be predator.
But how far does all this go? If the question is whether the
state has a legitimate interest in preventing gay marriages, then
the zonal question is neither here nor there. If the question is
whether the state can regulate consensual homosexual acts in
private, the property interest does become relevant. Now we are
less concerned about generalized protection against seduction
(which is captured in the word "consensual"), so that the per-
formance of these acts in private cuts in their favor because no
one else is forced to watch these activities in a concert hall or on a
park bench. Thus far we have found no reason whatsoever to
limit either homosexual conduct or gay marriages.7'
2. Relational interests and associational rights.
These relational interests are just another variation on the
principle of freedom of association. Kendall (not Justice) Thomas
(and Koppelman) follow the modern trend by limiting the scope of
12 Andrew Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law,
chap 2 (forthcoming 2002).
7' The question of adoption by gay and lesbian couples raises yet different questions
beyond the scope of this paper. The simplest and most sensible approach is to avoid ex-
plicit decisions by judges and public authorities on how sexual orientation should be taken
into account. Rather than having states decide that homosexuality is an immoral condi-
tion or a total irrelevancy, the best approach is to let the natural mother decide whether
this orientation matters to her. These decentralized decisions should over the long run
track popular sentiments without forcing the state to weigh in on one side or the other.
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the principle to cases of intimate association,7' which strikes me
as an unacceptable truncation of the more expansive view that
treats freedom of association as a subspecies of the general free-
dom of contract." But either way, why does it not work in this
case? Koppelman gives just the wrong answer: "If all associations
were protected, then the prohibition of criminal conspiracy and
solicitation would be unconstitutional."6 But that is precisely the
point: those forms of association are limited because of their
negative externalities. Accordingly, the state can override the
presumption in favor of associational rights by showing threats to
third persons that come from the combined efforts of the parties.
The two situations are so distinct that we can say that any excep-
tions that we might wish to advance on the matter of either gay
marriage or homosexual acts is faint indeed.
3. Decisional interests and interference with
others' liberties.
Thomas' third head of privacy interests says that individuals
are entitled to "freedom to choose how to conduct their lives.""
Precisely so, but again only presumptively. The argument here is
that individuals may exercise their freedom to choose only as long
as they do not limit the like liberties of others. But in either of
these cases, just where is the threat to those liberties? No one has
to approve or disapprove of homosexual behavior. Those people
who approve can conduct their lives accordingly. Those who do
not like gay partnerships can refuse to celebrate their consumma-
tion. No one would allow a gay person to argue that heterosexual
marriages should be banned because he finds them offensive. The
argument applies with equal force to heterosexual condemnation
of same-sex partnerships.
4. The autonomy principle and euthanasia.
We still have other cases that are worthy of consideration.
Koppelman asks whether the state ban on suicide and assisted
suicide (even with respect to healthy persons) should be struck
74 Koppelman, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 109 (cited in note 34), citing Thomas, 92 Colum
L Rev at 1443-49 (cited in note 71).
75 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy
Scouts, 74 So Calif L Rev 119 (2000).
76 Koppelman, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 110 (cited in note 34).
77 Id.
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down on the strength of the autonomy principle.78 By all means,
no; but we can at least state the reason." We know that there is a
high level of consensual sex, and we require therefore that the
rape charge be made out on a case-by-case basis, with consent as
a viable defense.' But with respect to suicide, we know that the
base rate of consent by healthy individuals is vanishingly low,
and thus in this context, we can rule out the consent defense be-
cause we are convinced that the high rate of error in the case-by-
case determination justifies the per se rule.' It therefore is no
surprise that much of the debate about euthanasia turns on the
question of whether that presumption should survive in cases
where its evidentiary foundation is far weaker." In some cases,
abuse and undue influence may lead people to consent to suicide.
In other cases, it is a release devoutly to be desired. Now ,the
question is far muddier, and it is easy to see why a court does not
want to preclude legislative action on the matter when the issue
is so closely balanced, and the level of intermediate techniques
(for example, independent boards to review cases) are available.'
But once again, the inquiry of choice is not whether we can find
exceptions to a general norm, but rather whether we can organize
those exceptions into a coherent whole. I think that coherence is
possible, and thus return to my original question: what, thus far,
has overridden the original presumption in favor of liberty of ac-
tion in the case of gay marriage?
78 Id.
79 For a fuller development of this argument, see Richard A. Epstein, Mortal Peril:
Our Inalienable Right to Health Care? 299-306 (Addison-Wesley 1997).
80 See, for example, State v Camara, 781 P2d 483, 485-86 (Wash 1989) ("Though the
[Washington] rape statutes no longer expressly mention non-consent as an element of
rape, we believe consent remains a valid defense to a rape charge.").
8' For a somewhat more collectivist account of the matter, see Model Penal Code
§ 210.5(2) cmt 5 (1980) (revised commentary on the Model Penal Code as adopted in 1962)
(noting that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal
homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking
the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the
request of the suicide victim").
82 For an elaboration of this argument, see Epstein, Mortal Peril at 299-305 (cited in
note 79).
See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 751 (1997) ("Throughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue,
as it should in a democratic society.").
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C. Reconciling Gay Marriage with the Morals Head of the
Police Power Cases
The inquiry is not over, however, because we still have to
deal with the infection issue that lay behind much of the early
morals/police power decisions, which of course were squarely di-
rected towards issues of both health and safety.' Does the risk of
contagion from AIDS justify the prohibition on gay marriages? It
is very hard to see why it does. To the extent that these mar-
riages stabilize personal relationships, they reduce the likelihood
of frequent, serial sexual contacts and thus should help combat
the infection risk, which I believe they do. But the regulation of
homosexual behavior, like that of prostitution, is much more
closely balanced. Let us not forget that AIDS was, and is, not just
a social construction; it is also, indubitably, a sexually transmit-
ted disease. We also know that AIDS is not confined to gay men
and can be spread by other means, such as the use of drugs.
There is a question as to whether state regulation should be di-
rected toward homosexual activity (where the risks are higher) or
be cast in more general terms. The situation is most complex. We
know that persons who are HIV-positive do not have ideal incen-
tives to prevent its spread.' Any efforts to use government force
to control against such a risk is hard to execute," but at least one
has to address the second stage inquiry: whether the means cho-
sen are well calibrated to deal with the harm. To take but one
case, I think that the case for shutting down the bath houses be-
fore the contagion risk manifests itself is quite strong, for the
danger of spread is the greatest precisely when the disease is in
its latent phase. The idea that we should start intervention only
when evidence of palpable harm seems to be a clear instance of
the mistake of "too little too late." This proposal is certainly a far
cry from the criminalization of all homosexual activities. But it
84 See, for example, Ernst Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional
Right (Callaghan & Company 1904).
8' For an account of its initial spread through the efforts of one man, Gaetan Dugas,
see Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic 21-23
(St. Martin's 1987).
Note here extreme measures such as the HIV quarantine policies of China, Cuba,
Sweden, and Japan. See Melanie L. McCall, Comment, AIDS Quarantine Law in the In-
ternational Community: Health and Safety Measures or Human Rights Violations? 15
Loyola-LA Intl & Comp L J 1001 (1993). See also Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the Tu-
berculosis Epidemic: The Legality of Coercive Treatment Measures, 27 Colum J L & Soc
Probs 101 (1993) (examining the legality of involuntary detention and directly observed
therapy measures to control the tuberculosis epidemic).
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does indicate that traditional concerns of the police power still
have some staying power in the area of homosexual relationships,
even if none of them support the result in Bowers.
To my mind, there is only one loose end with respect to gay
marriages, and that concerns the choice of name. Here the issue
is really one of "confusion," and thus worthy of the trademark
lawyer. Many people may be rightly upset that the similarity in
names will lead to an erosion of support for the traditional insti-
tution. So at this point, the use of the term "domestic partner-
ship" helps eliminate the confusion while allowing gay individu-
als to enjoy certain status benefits (for example, joint tax returns)
that they could not acquire simply by a contract arrangement
between themselves. Once this is done, I think that it is hard to
see why the state has an interest in banning these relationships,
at least if it has an interest in preserving ordinary marriages.
The case for gay rights does quite well with this analysis.
D. Whither Equal Protection?
Now, how does all this change if we move to the equal protec-
tion framework on which Koppelman relies? As best I can tell, not
one whit. In light of what was said above, the equal protection
analysis may be weaker, but is surely never stronger, when it is
possible to identify a particular liberty interest, as is the case
here. But at the same token the equal protection arguments serve
as a backstop because it allows private individuals to challenge a
statutory classification as inconsistent even in the absence of a
clear liberty interest. Both strands of the argument are at stake
here. There is no reason to abandon the strong due process claim
in favor of a somewhat chancier equal protection argument.
1. The traditionalist view of equal protection.
The initial question on equal protection is whether the state
makes a permissible classification when it marks gay relation-
ships for special treatment. To the traditional lawyer, the mere
fact that homosexual conduct was condemned in the Bible and
was widely regarded as an unnatural abomination ends the mat-
ter. The Equal Protection Clause no more requires one to give
87 See, for example, Ex Parte H.H., 2002 WL 227956 at *5 (Ala) (Moore concurring)
("Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a
crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God upon which
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legal protection to gays than it does to adulterers, burglars and
murderers. To defeat this position requires an examination of the
soundness of the grounds for this distinction, which quickly gets
us back to the question of the strength of the state interest. The
traditionalist will argue that the state's interest is at least as
strong for a rudderless equal protection claim as it is for a more
specific claim that rests on privacy or liberty. No matter what
clause is invoked, we do not strike down prohibitions that have
been with us since the dawn of Anglo-American law.
Alternatively, let us suppose that one is able to persuade a
court that the right doctrinal approach is to say that any and all
distinctions should be suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.
Well, there remains the question of whether a particular distinc-
tion can be justified under the police power. So, once again, we
are drawn back to the question of whether the morals head of the
police power permits the discriminations that the statute makes.
How this doctrinal shift advances the status of gay marriage over
that under a privacy analysis is not at all clear to me.
Nor is it clear on an institutional basis. Koppelman (drawing
on Bork) makes much of the inability of courts to solve these
boundary questions under due process, to which one answer is
that they have solved them in a number of cases where they care
about the outcome. And a second answer is that they are going to
have to face these identical boundary questions under the equal
protection clause anyhow.' So the new equal protection home for
gay marriages does not fare better on these institutional grounds
than on any other.
2. Private discrimination.
So then is there any reason for choosing equal protection over
privacy? And here I think that there is, at least at first blush. The
leading edge of the equal protection doctrine is, of course, the
non-discrimination principle. And one thing that Koppelman
would like very much to see is the enforcement of state laws
against private discrimination. Thus, at one point, he writes:
"Even if private sex acts between consenting adults are not prop-
erly within the reach of the criminal law, this falls far short of
equality for gays. It is entirely consistent with pervasive dis-
this Nation and our laws are predicated. Such conduct violates both the criminal and civil
laws of this State and is destructive to a basic building block of society-the family.").
88 Koppelman, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 106-07 (cited in note 34).
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crimination."'9 At another point he stresses: "Much of what is at
stake in the gay rights issue is public equality and recognition,
not simply a right to conduct secret liaisons undisturbed by thelaw.'00
This, frankly, is an agenda that cannot be reached under a
Lochner-like approach that stresses the importance of liberty and
property within a police power framework. The clear implication
of the freedom of contract principle is that all persons (whatever
their sexual orientation) are entitled to choose their trading or
social partners unless, perhaps, they occupy a monopoly position.
The rule of freedom of association operates therefore as a bul-
wark against the application of the antidiscrimination laws to
private persons in competitive markets or ordinary social interac-
tions.
The modern insistence that the protection of this freedom
extends only to "intimate" associations makes it possible to have
one's cake and eat it too. Now there is perfect freedom in personal
matters, and generalized protection against what might loosely
be called economic discrimination, where it is left unstated
whether gay businesses are under a duty to hire straight persons
to work for them. The real question here is whether there is a
principled case for this rule. I have argued at length against the
antidiscrimination laws in private employment contexts gener-
ally, and will not do anything but repeat my conclusion here:
open markets with free entry are the strongest protections that
individuals have against invidious discrimination. 1 It seems to
me that the classic Lochner position cuts in just the right direc-
tion.
The same is true of the question of social protection and rec-
ognition. It is simply not the law's business if individuals are al-
lowed to have freedom of thought and conscience on their own
behalf. Once the civil liberties of all individuals are protected,
then no person, wise or evil, has control over the levers of state
power to induce certain attitudes toward other individuals. The
state should work hard to preserve peace and prevent violence,
and to do so for all persons against all threats. But it becomes a
matter of private dialogue and debate as to which people are re-
89 Id at 108.
90 Id at 109, citing Carol Steiker, Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orienta-
tion: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv L Rev 1285, 1288-92 (1985).
91 See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Laws 28-58 (Harvard 1992).
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spected for what activities, and it should be no part of the law to
impose a uniform set of beliefs to either praise or (lest we forget)
to condemn certain forms of sexual orientation.
The Lochner view of limited government thus cuts into Kop-
pelman's agenda by insulating private discrimination from the
control of the state. But the Equal Protection Clause requires the
same result. Recall that the Clause requires individuals to re-
ceive equal protection of the laws." That is perfectly consistent
with a legal system that protects freedom of association and con-
tract for all persons. In order to fill in the gaps of the argument, it
therefore becomes necessary to delineate the substantive grounds
on which distinctions can and cannot be made. On this point, it
seems clear that the Equal Protection Clause has to be read in
context with a Constitution that does offer protections to liberty
and property (in the adjacent Due Process Clause, no less). It
would be odd, to say the least, to import two radically different
philosophies of the use and scope of government power in the
name of equal protection than we do in the name of due process.
To the extent, therefore, that the regime of liberty and property
cuts against Koppelman's program, so too does the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, which works as a barrier against state action. The
creation of the public morality that he desires should be properly
a subject of public debate in which he may well hold all the high
cards. If so, then it is all the more important that Koppelman
makes his position through argumentation rather than diminish-
ing the legitimacy of his worldview by forcing it on a few dissent-
ers. Equal protection or privacy is not the issue; rather, it is a
clearer sense of constitutional role and function.
92 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv L Rev 537, 559-60 (1982)
(arguing that there is a misconception about the notion of "rights" and "equality" based on
a legal and moral misunderstanding about the role of equality in ethical discourse).
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